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The underclass has become a prominent issue in American social wel-
fare, yet welfare professionals have focused on maintenance as opposed
to mainstreaming strategies in working with this population. A main-
streaming strategy would emphasize individual incentives, community
reconstruction, and program reorganization, focusing on the social dis-
organization of underclass communities. The essay details specific pro-
grams in each of these areas: transitional benefits, Community Enterprise
Zones, and Integrated Service Agencies, among others. Welfare profes-
sionals must find ways to stretch existing public resources and identify
new private resources if they are to pose plausible programs for the
underclass. The public image of welfare professionals will be enhanced
if effective programs to reduce the underclass can be implemented.
Since the mid-1980s, policy analysts and welfare profession-
als have expressed concern about the social circumstance of the
poorest of Americans. The term, "underclass", now appears reg-
ularly to describe this population. Variously, estimated at be-
tween 2.5 million (Alter, 1988) and 9 million (Kornblum, 1984)
people, the underclass is predominantly urban, poor, black, un-
deremployed, and poorly educated. Yet, despite the social di-
versity of this population, prominent social observers have begun
to speak of the underclass as a valid social category, as well as
an unavoidable social problem.
That the economic condition of the poor has deteriorated
significantly during the last decade is indisputable. During the
first term of the Reagan administration alone, $57 billion was
*The author wishes to thank Harris Chaiklin of the University of Maryland
School of Social Work and Community Planning for his comments on an
earlier draft of this essay.
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cut from social programs that benefited low- and moderate-in-
come Americans (Greenstein, 1987). Because social insurance
programs were better defended against rescissions, most budget
cuts were exacted from means-tested programs. Between 1970
and 1988, the actual value of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) benefits declined 35% due to inflation (House
Ways and Means Committee, 1988, p. 415). In other words, had
AFDC benefits been adjusted for inflation, benefits in 1988 would
have been $5.88 billion higher than projected allocations. By the
late-1980s the income disparity between the wealthiest and
poorest quintiles of the population was the widest since such
data were first computed in 1947.
But the economic factor is only half of the underclass story.
Accompanying the economic deterioration of the poor was a
collapse of social institutions, notably the family. Between 1970
and 1984, the number of black families headed by women more
than doubled (National Urban League, 1986). Incidence of unwed
pregnancy skyrocketed among nonwhites, reaching 50% of all
births by 1983 (Novak, 1987). The proliferation of a derivative
of cocaine, "crack", with poor communities highlighted the de-
dine of social institutions. While drug abuse appeared to drop
in the United States, use of "crack" mushroomed. Between 1976
and 1985, the number of emergency room episodes attributed
to cocaine use rose by a factor of ten, approaching 10,000 (Schus-
ter, 1987, pp. 1-2). Gang activity, related to drug trafficking,
spread through major American cities and became the focus of
a popular movie, Colors. Clearly, the "extraordinary levels of
self-destructive behavior [and] interpersonal violence" could no
longer be ignored in discussions of hard-core poverty (Moyni-
han, 1988, p. 291).
Conceptual Basis of The Underclass
Contemporary explanations for the underclass phenomenon
drew from analyses over a century old. Karl Marx, of course,
identified a lumpenproletariat, but did little with the concept
since he considered it reactionary, not revolutionary. In the United
States, Charles Loring Brace conducted his pioneering work in
child welfare among the "dangerous dasses" of New York, au-
thoring a classic in the social welfare literature by the same
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name. The increasing sophistication of social sciences during
the first half of the twentieth century discredited the earlier,
more simplistic stratification approaches. Even the studies of
hard-core poverty during the 1960s-Elliott Liebow's Tally's Cor-
ner and Oscar Lewis's The Children of Sanchez-were ethno-
graphic in nature.
By the late 1970s, however, several observers claimed that
the social phenomenon of intransigent poverty was increasing
in scale, appeared to be generating pathology in already bur-
dened communities, and seemed immune to conventional wel-
fare programs designed to help the poor. Douglas Glasgow
attributed the underdass to "structural factors found in market
dynamics and institutional practices" such as racism (1981, p. 4).
Ken Auletta's The Underclass (1982) classified the populations
comprising the underdass-high-school dropouts, drug addicts,
the welfare dependent, and offenders-and described the lim-
ited success of a job-training program which was intended to
boost participants out of the underclass. Significantly, Auletta
observed that the underdass differed from the poor because of
the degree of psychological and social disorganization that proved
self-destructive or counter-productive.
As the inner cities became increasingly desolate, accounts of
the underclass in larger cities appeared. Nicholas Lemann's At-
lantic Monthly series on "The Origins of the Underclass" attrib-
uted the worsening of circumstance for Chicago's Blacks to the
exodus of middle-class Blacks who had provided a stabilizing
influence to the inner city (1986). On the twentieth anniversary
of urban rioting in Washington, D.C., journalists noted that in
the interim an underclass had emerged in the nation's capitol
(Fisher and Pianin, 1988). Editors of The New Republic branded
the underclass as "the largest single domestic policy challenge
today" (New Republic, 1988, p. 9).
As the interaction of social and economic factors contributed
to the downward spiral of conditions in poor communities, pol-
icy analysts from both ends of the ideological continuum offered
explanations for the growing underdass. Among conservatives,
such as George Gilder (1981), Charles Murray (1984), Lawrence
Mead (1986), and Stuart Butler and Anna Kondratas (1987), the
underdass was attributed to the dependency-inducing welfare
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programs of the War on Poverty. Lured away from self-suffi-
ciency by government social programs that expected little in
exchange for benefits, the welfare poor gradually lost the capac-
ity to live independently. The conservative solution to the un-
derclass problem was to diminish, or make conditional,
governmental assistance in order to force the poor to be more
self-sufficient. Among liberals, such as Frances Fox Piven and
Richard Cloward (1982), Robert Reich (1983), Robert Kuttner
(1984), and William Julius Wilson (1987), the underdass was the
consequence of continuous under-investment in community in-
stitutions and human capital on the part of all levels of govern-
ment. The consequence of this lack of government investment
in poor people was the economic implosion of poor communities
which began to generate an enormous volume of social and
psychological disorder. The liberal solution to the underclass
problem, then, was to increase governmental assistance in ed-
ucation, health, employment, and housing for poor communities.
Unfortunately, for all the discussion the debate over the un-
derclass has failed to generate a plan for contending with it.
Conservatives have tended to overestimate the ability of the poor
to become self-sufficient; liberals failed to recognize the persis-
tent nature of poverty for many of the poor and the unwilling-
ness of the public to finance new social programs. As a result
social policy has become stalemated while the underclass grows.
For welfare professionals, the underdass is a particularly dif-
ficult issue. Beginning with the Carter administration, human
service workers began to suffer reductions in funding for ser-
vices to the poor, a process accelerated by the Reagan admin-
istration. In the face of such adversity, welfare proponents have
been occupied defending existing programs against further re-
ductions and had little time to consider new initiatives. Com-
pounding this was a professional ideology defined around
specialization. Welfare professionals were inclined to interpret
social phenomena in the form of discreet problems, such as
income, employment, housing, and mental impairment. Regrett-
ably, the program fragmentation associated with specialization
did not seem to have ameliorated problems of the most destitute;
and, in fact, the failure to coordinate benefits for the most needy
contributed to making things worse. Finally, there was a be-
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havioral dimension to the underclass that welfare professionals
were reluctant to acknowledge. Welfare professionals tended to
be liberal and, therefore, sensitive to the fact that the underclass
was disproportionately minority. Raising the issue of the un-
derclass proved problematic for them when minority adovcates
were quick to identify the victimization-and racism-implicit
in any blanket generalizations about their communities. Since
the mid-1960s, liberal scholars had been urged to focus less on
the pathology of minority communities, and identify their
strengths instead. Unfortunately, this meant that many liberal
scholars failed to see the disintegration of the black community
at the very time it was occuring, out of fear that it would violate
the ideological courtesies of the post-Civil Rights Era (Wilson,
1987, 1988; Jencks, 1988).
Mainstreaming the Underclass
Because of these factors, welfare professionals have been at
a disadvantage in proposing strategies for dealing with the un-
derdass. To a great extent, efforts have focused on the worth-
while objective of maintaining those who have suffered from the
severe reductions in income and social supports due to cuts in
federal welfare programs. For the poor who have fallen into the
ranks of the underclass, emergency shelters and soup kitchens
are essential in providing immediate relief. And, some of these
efforts have advanced to the point of providing education, train-
ing, and job-finding services. Still, there is too little attention
directed toward mainstreaming strategies which could reduce the
size of the underclass in the first place. A mainstreaming ap-
proach would emphasize individual incentives, community re-
construction, and program reorganization, while focusing on the
social disorganization of underdass communities. "If strong
norms and sanctions against aberrant behavior, a sense of com-
munity, and positive neighborhood identification are the essen-
tial features of social organization in urban areas," wrote Wilson,
"inner city neighborhoods today suffer from a severe lack of
social organization" (1988, p. 58). At the same time, such an
approach must recognize budgetary restraints. "Our domestic
budget [has been] shredded," warned Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
producing an unavoidable "protracted fiscal crisis for the next
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two or three presidencies. Probably until the next century" (1988,
pp. 33, 293). Accordingly, welfare professionals must find ways
to stretch existing public resources and identify new private
resources if they are to pose plausible programs for the
underclass.
Individual Incentives
Any plan to improve the standard of living of this population
must address economic opportunity. Many in the underclass
work, although usually in jobs that do not provide benefits. The
best strategy for improving the economic circumstance of the
underclass is to implement a range of transitional-or supple-
mental-benefits that dearly advantage those who voluntarily
participate in the labor market. Transitional benefits have ap-
peared in recently enacted welfare reform legislation, where pro-
vision is made for public assistance beneficiaries to continue to
receive health and child care benefits for a one year period while
they are moving into the labor market. Unfortunately, this lim-
ited interpretation of the concept applies only to those eligible
for public assistance, is terminated after a brief period, and is
financed totally from government funds.
A more generous interpretation would universalize transi-
tional benefits, making such benefits available to anyone in the
labor market who is not already covered by benefits from an
employer. The model for this is the Massachusetts health care
plan which mandates that employers provide insurance to em-
ployees much as they already do for unemployment compensa-
tion. Half of the cost of universalizing transitional benefits should
be borne by employers. If employers expect to benefit from the
performance of workers, they should be expected to share the
cost with government. This is a reasonable expectation since
many service industry employers now use workers less than
full-time in order to dodge the cost of benefit packages. It is also
reasonable to expect government to cover a portion of the cost
of benefits for those who have become dependent on public
welfare. Requiring employers to pay half of the cost of transi-
tional benefits, would create government savings which could
be used to universalize benefits to the population of the working
poor.
Underclass
If poor workers are to get a better shake out of working in
the labor market, they should also expect to be able to use their
investment in work as a basis on which to retire. Presently, most
low income workers have little more to retire on than Social
Security, a pension program that was intended to supplement
workers' private pensions. But, because members of the under-
class are part of the secondary labor force in which work is
erratic, part-time, and with few benefits, they are unlikely to
have contributed enough during their working history to receive
more than the minimum benefit. Poor workers should be en-
couraged to establish individual retirement plans in order to
supplement their Social Security benefits. Skeptics of the ability
of the poor to be prudent need only be reminded that mutual
benefit associations and fraternal orders flourished in the black
community before the turn of the century (Franklin, 1980, p. 288).
One way to encouarge the poor to plan for retirement is to
alter tax policy so that Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
clearly advantage the poor, instead of the wealthy as they have
done in the past. Under a proposed Equitable Retirement Income
Credit (ERIC), workers could claim a credit for investing in their
retirement security. Under a credit arrangement, contributions
would result in the same tax savings regardless of the taxpayer's
income bracket; but, a progressive credit schedule would tilt the
advantage toward lower income workers. For example, under the
proposed ERIC, the maximum annual contribution to an IRA is
increased to $5,000 and incremental credits based on contribu-
tions are earned at rates beginning at 50% of the first $1,000 and
declining for every additional $1,000 of contributions. Tax re-
ductions for contributors to ERIC are depicted in the following
table.
ERIC illustrates how benefits can be geared toward retire-
ment planning. A variety of incentives to encourage the under-
class to participate fully in the labor market are needed if the
poorest workers are to perceive work as a constructive part of
their past and the vehicle for future security.
Community Reconstruction
Measures to contend with the underdass are unlikely to be
efffective if they fail to reinforce institutions in poor commu-
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Table 1
Equitable Retirement Income Credit
Amount of Bracket Amount of Maximum
Contribution Credit Credit Credit
$0-1000 50% 50% of contribution $ 500
$1001-2000 40% $500 + (40% x excess
over $1000) $ 900
$2001-3000 30% $900 + (30% x excess
over $2000) $1,200
$3001-4000 20% $1200 + (20% x excess
over $3000) $1,400
$4001-5000 10% $1400 + (10% X excess
over $4000) $1,500
nities. Historically, community development has been tricky for
human service professionals who have distrusted the conser-
vatizing influences of local social institutions, particularly the
somewhat autocratic institutions that have often aided the un-
derclass, particularly religious organizations. As stereotypes go,
this one too is incomplete and innaccurate. Harry Boyte and
Sara Evans (1987) contend that local voluntary organizations have
been a source of social transformation in the past and they offer
the same promise for the future. Marc Bendick (1985) has noted
that social welfare in the United States has been associated with
local voluntary associations more than the governmental mega-
structures of the European welfare states. Yet, welfare profes-
sionals have largely depended on governmental initiatives that
have provided benefits directly to individuals, bypassing com-
munity institutions.
During the 1980s, a series of economic development initia-
tives demonstrated that poor communities could become more
economically viable. The Enterprise Foundation, founded by
James Rouse in 1981, has pumped millions of dollars into poor
communities, primarily for the construction of badly needed
housing (O'Connell, 1987, p. 218). By 1983, the Ford Foundation-
sponsored Local Initiatives Support Corporation had supported
197 community development projects which provided a variety
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of tangible benefits to poor communities (Local Initiatives, 1980,
1981). Unfortunately, the Reagan administration was unable to
capitalize on these experiments and failed to enact its economic
development policy-Urban Enterprise Zones-to aid poor
communities. This failure, coupled with continued cuts in com-
munity development programs, has left a vacuum in urban policy.
Social and economic institutions in poor communities could
be strengthened through a Community Enterprise Zone (CEZ)
program that would provide technical assistance and time-lim-
ited grants for the purpose of providing basic commodities, such
as jobs and housing. The geographic basis of a CEZ would be
an economic catchment area of from 4,000 to 50,000 population
to accomodate rural and urban environments. The CEZ bound-
ary would respect geopolitical lines, such as political wards,
county lines, and school districts. Eligibility for community de-
velopment benefits would depend on the social and economic
conditions of the catchment area. A variety of indicators are
available for this purpose-incidence of poverty, unemploy-
ment, and business dosings. Catchment areas in which the rates
for two of these three variables exceeded one standard deviation
above the national average would be eligible for benefits.
Two types of aid would be provided to communities. For
communities in which the infrastructure is particularly weak,
CEZ benefits would consist of technical assistance and devel-
opment grants. Rather than provide the assistance directly, gov-
ernment would contract services from those organizations, such
as the Enterprise Foundation and the Local Initiatives Support
Corporation, which have a successful track record in economic
development. For communities experiencing acute dislocation,
a system of incentives, including tax credits, would be instituted
to retain and promote entrepreneurial activity.
Funding for the CEZ program could be derived from a "Com-
munity Enterprize Zone Insurance Fund" created by taxing pri-
vate and public construction. In 1986, for example, a 2% tax on
construction in the United States would have netted $77.7 bil-
lion, 1 more than the amount identified by Jesse Jackson as nec-
essary for domestic economic development and neighborhood
revitalization in his 1988 presidential campaign (Shaughnessy,
1988, p. 1). In effect, CEZ funding would insure communities
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against economic dislocation by providing a mechanism whereby
all communities could be eligible for benefits. Since benefits
would be drawn from an insurance fund, they would not be as
vulnerable to budget constraints imposed on programs that are
dependent on general revenues.
The CEZ concept can complement other social programs that
are important to the underclass. Regarding workfare, for ex-
ample, welfare beneficiaries could be allowed a choice of com-
munity development entity to which their benefits could be
assigned. In order to collect benefits, those on workfare would
have to engage in job-like tasks identified by the community
development agency. Within a CEZ, community development
entities would have to meet standards of the welfare department
relating to personnel and benefit management, but would other-
wise be free to define community development projects and as-
sign beneficiaries to them. Beneficiaries would have a choice
among community development agencies in which to enroll;
once enrolled, beneficiaries could transfer to another community
development agency-or to other employment-much like em-
ployees change jobs in the labor market. Such an arrangement
would assure a measure of social responsibility on the part of
welfare beneficiaries and do so in a way that directly benefits
the communities in which they live. Coupling workfare and
community development also solves one of the more insidious
problems of welfare. "You cannot get good at welfare," observed
William Raspberry, "It does no good for a welfare mother to
impress her case worker with her quick grasp or her sense of
responsibility to take on an extra task. There is no way for a
welfare client to distinguish himself, in any economically useful
way, from any other welfare dient. There are no promotions on
welfare" (1988).
Program Reorganization
In many respects, the behavioral problems attributed to the
underdass are the most perplexing to contend with. The amount
of social and psychological disorganization evident in the un-
derclass is an enormous burden for those who could participate
more fully in the mainstream. This problem has been exacer-
bated by reductions in funding for health and welfare services
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which have forced authorities to target resources for the most
seriously disturbed. At the same time, health and welfare ben-
efits available to the unstable poor are often wasted because
those eligible fail to press claims for benefits or benefits do not
conform to the circumstances of underclass life. In some in-
stances, people are actually "disentitled" from benefits by bu-
reaucrats who use convoluted eligibility procedures to deny
benefits as a way to reduce program costs (Lipsky, 1984). The
misuse of resources is graphically depicted by a cost accounting
of benefits used by a chronically mentally ill Californian who
ran up charges for county health, mental health, welfare, and
housing services totaling $28,000 in one year (an amount ex-
duding costs for legal services and incarceration) (Task Force,
1987, p. 14).
Services for the seriously emotionally disturbed can be op-
timized through the Integrated Service Agency (ISA) concept,
pioneered in Wisconsin and proposed for California. An ISA is
a public or private organization providing a range of services to
emotionally disturbed adults on a capitation basis. As con-
ceived, the California ISA model requires that each agency em-
ploy a staff of approximately ten professional and nonprofessional
staff to serve approximately 150 members. Member services in-
dude 24-hour crisis intervention, supported independent living,
socialization and recreation, employment, psychotherapy, legal
assistance, money management, and advocacy, among others.
Operating funds for each ISA are derived from existing categor-
ical programs-such as Food Stamps, Supplemental Security In-
come, Medicaid, Title XX, Vocational Rehabilitation-which are
pooled, then assigned to each ISA on a capitation basis. The
pooling of categorical benefits in this manner resulted in an
estimated budget for each California ISA of $3 million (Task
Force, 1987; Task Force, 1988).
The advantages of reorganizing services through the ISA
concept are multiple. Existing benefits which are fragmented
and not used well by many of the destitute are ear-marked for
this population. Agencies are reimbursed according to the mem-
bers they serve, so that the loss of a member means a reduction
in funding to the ISA. Significantly, ISAs are free to use any
surplus-the difference between the capitation payment and
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actual cost of service delivery-to generate innovative program-
ming. Assuming a capitation payment of $20,000/member, the
possibility of generating such a surplus is very real. Since fund-
ing is derived from existing categorical programs, funding for
the ISA concept is limited to relatively modest appropriations for
program start-up. Finally, the ISA concept appears applicable for
those suffering from social disorganization, such as the home-
less, who could benefit from a service delivery strategy that
focuses a variety of poorly-used benefits toward this population.
Conclusion
A mainstreaming strategy for dealing with the underclass
addresses one long-standing problem associated with those wel-
fare programs that emphasize client maintenance-stigmatiza-
tion. Currently, most services and benefits to the poor are offered
in a manner which segregates them from the mainstream. The
result is too often the obstruction to social and economic inte-
gration by substandard services which are intended to help the
poor. Compounding the problems of the poor, governmental so-
cial services have suffered from ambivalence on the part of the
public toward federal control of social programs, reflected in a
reluctance to endure the tax burden that these programs impose.
The combination of these problems has led to a situation that
is all but intractable. Segregated services are so stigmatized that
prospective clients fail to use them, even when they are eligible,
leaving policy makers and administrators at an impasse.
A mainstreaming strategy for dealing with the underclass is
one way to break this impasse. Significantly, an approach that
emphasizes such initiatives as transitional benefits, Community
Enterprise Zones, and Integrated Service Agencies could attract
support from both ends of the political continuum. The Left will
endorse programs that promise to revitalize communities that
are economically bereft. The Right will support initiatives that
reinforce self-sufficiency. Common to both camps is an assertion
that the poor can participate in the mainstream if given an ad-
equate opportunity.
As importantly, the creation of an effective strategy for re-
versing the growth of the underclass could restore a measure of
public credibility for social welfare professionals who have been
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much maligned during the last decade. On the defensive polit-
ically, advocates for social justice have struggled to protect cat-
egorical programs for the poor from further budget cuts.
Unfortunately, this client maintenance strategy has left welfare
professionals vulnerable to accusations of fostering welfare de-
pendency. Human service professionals must begin to take the
offensive in social welfare; in this respect the underdass rep-
resents an opportunity for welfare professionals to demonstrate
to the public that it can solve very difficult problems, indeed.
The necessity for creative thinking about questions of social
welfare has been stated eloquently by Daniel Patrick Moynihan.
"We need a rebirth of social policy as both a moral and an
empirical exercise," he wrote, "free of the mindless millenialism
of the past and the equally thoughtless meanness of the present"
(1988, p. 265). Social welfare professionals, in other words, have
much to gain by accepting the challenge posed by the underdass.
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